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Abstract 
This article presents the results of a research project focusing on evaluations of education as a part of 
a new public management in the area of education. 
The empirical material consists of: 
 
- 8 state-sanctioned evaluations of the formal training programs for the positions in a medical 
field 
- various texts on evaluations 
- various examples of Danish evaluation research. 
 
A field of producers of Danish evaluation research is constructed as part of a field of power: 
analogous to the analysed evaluations, Danish evaluation research forms a discourse legitimizing 
socially necessary administrative interventions. The evaluations and the evaluation research are 
constructed as parts of a mechanism performing and legitimizing a sorting to an existing social order. 
The theoretical starting point is in theories primarily by Émile Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu and Ulf 
P. Lundgren. 
Sammendrag 
Denne artikel præsenterer resultaterne af et forskningsprojekt med fokus på 
uddannelsesevalueringer som del af en new public management inden for uddnnelsesområdet. Det 
empiriske materiale består af 
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- 8 statssanktionerede evalueringer af uddannelserne til positionerne inden for et medicinsk 
felt 
- forskellige tekster om evaluering 
- forskellige eksempler på dansk evalueringsforskning. 
 
Et felt af producenter af dansk evalueringsforskning konstrueres som del af et magtens felt. 
Analogt til det som ses i de analyserede evalueringer, danner der sig inden for dansk 
evalueringsforskning en diskurs som legitimerer socialt nødvendige administrative interventioner. 
Evalueringerne og evalueringsforskningen konstrueres som dele af en mekanisme som udfører og 
legitimerer sorteringen til en eksisterende social orden.  
Det teoretiske udgangspunkt er i teorierne først og fremmest af Émilie Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu 
og Ulf P. Lundgren. 
Nøgleord: evaluering, uddannelsesevaluering,  social reproduktion, samfund efter det Moderne, 
meritokrat 
Résumé 
L'article présente les résultats d'une recherche qui voit les évaluations des éducation comme un cas 
de “Nouvelle Organisation Publique” dans le secteur de la formation et de l'éducation. Les données 
empiriques comportent: 
 
- 8 évaluations, homologuées par l'État, de programmes de formation pour des positions dans 
le champ de la maladie/santé 
- différents textes sur les problèmes de l'évaluation 
- différents exemples Danois de recherches sur les problèmes de l' évaluation. 
 
Le champ des producteurs de recherches scientifiques sur l'évaluation est construit comme 
faisant part du champ du pouvoir. De manière analogue aux évaluations étudiées, la recherche 
scientifique Danoise sur l'évaluation se présente elle aussi comme un discours pour légitimiser des 
interventions administratives d'avance socialement nécessaires. La recherche présentée dans l'article 
construit ces évaluations empiriques et ces recherches scientifiques sur l'évaluation, comme des 
mécanismes qui réalisent et légitimisent l'allocation des positions professionnelles dans l'ordre social 
existant. 
L'inspiration théorique de la recherche vient principalement de Durkheim, Bourdieu et 
U.P.Lundgren. 
Mots clés: évaluation, évaluation de l'éducation / formation, reproduction sociale, sociétés d'après la 
modernité, méritocratie 
Entry, focus and interest 
The present article resumes the major findings of a research project reconstructing the social and 
symbolic function of evaluations of formal training programs. What is formulated in the project is a 
social theory about evaluations (science in a strict sense, cf. Durkheim, 1956), and even more 
specifically a social theory about the social and symbolic function of evaluations, i.e. about the proper 
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pedagogical function of evaluations.  The project is documented in the author’s dissertation (2008a) 
and in other texts by the author (cf. the list of references). The aim was never to formulate any kind 
of theory for evaluations in order allegedly to improve the evaluations. Within the chosen theoretical 
frame of reference this is done practically under the given circumstances. 
In the project it is shown that a purely scientific stance formulating a theoretical theory about 
evaluations is absent in a field of evaluation research: However refined, because of certain 
implications evaluation research consists of practical theory (cf. Durkheim, 1956), and gives priority 
to (explicitly or implicitly) normative approaches; evaluations, meta-evaluations, meta-evaluating 
theoretical work, methodologies etc. In this research project it is shown that this is state of the art in 
evaluation research1 This emphasizes the need for discussions such as the ones in the present article, 
and not only related to evaluation research. 
In accordance with a new public management, a performance seems to only legitimately exist as a 
performance if it has undergone some kind of alleged standardization2. In the last instance this 
implies an evaluation. This gives rise to complaints from the evaluated practicians. Practical 
experience tells them that improvements to their practice originate from the practical meeting of 
demands from practical circumstances and from helping each other, and not from formal 
evaluations. In turn it gives rise to an interest in examining the social and symbolic need for 
specialized instances with the exclusive right to produce what has been produced between peers for 
innumerable years. Why is it necessary to produce this quasi-knowledge in a more or less 
inapplicable form if the ambition were to improve the practice of the practicians whose practice is 
evaluated? 
The article contains a seminal work, applying first of all the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, and it 
adds to the existing evaluation research a strictly scientific, sociological or pedagogical explanation of 
the presence of evaluations. Following Bachelard (1968) the interest and aim in any scientific analysis 
is to break with an immediate understanding of (in the present project) what an evaluation is, that an 
evaluation is necessary and offers something indispensable for the concrete practice, and that a task 
is to (normatively) improve the evaluation or to simply choose the right one (cf. Bachelard, 1968). 
This narrows the perspective to explaining and understanding evaluations as an occurrence in the 
world: Why are they here? Who performs them? What are the implicit or explicit presuppositions of 
evaluations? What do they do? What is the social and symbolic function of evaluations? What are the 
social consequences of performing or deciding to carry out an evaluation and what is the symbolic 
function of performed or planned evaluations? The aim is to construct the practice of evaluations 
and to construct the true pedagogical function of evaluations of formal training programs i.e. the 
ones analysed in the present research project. The research questions are: What do evaluations do, 
pedagogically and sociologically? What are the practices of evaluations? And, more fundamentally: 
Why are evaluations necessary?. The research project outlines a theoretical theory, a strictly 
scientific theory, about evaluations. 
                                                          
1 In Callewaert (unpubl., 1976) the relation between evaluation and social reproduction is discussed. However, 
the discussions and explanations seen in this project, are not adressed in Callewaert's text. 
2 The examples are legion within a new public management: authorizations, standardizations, examinations, 
evaluations, risk assessments, quality standards, etc. etc. etc., and with the educational system as a prominent 
example of a system separating the right from the wrong and uniting and uniforming the right, involving 
intricate systems of evaluations, self-evaluations, meta-evaluations at any level, externally as well as internally 
etc. etc. etc. (see Bourdieu & Passeron, 1992 and even Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005). This work of evaluation 
implies and demands the cooperation of and is performed by a corps of specialists, most often trained in the 
social sciences (cf. below and Nørholm, 2001, p. 569, cf. also Callewaert, unpubl. 1976, p. 1). 
M. Nørholm – Outlining a theory of the social and symbolic function of evaluations of education 
 4 
Another focus is on the applied evaluation method, on the implicit or explicit presuppositions of 
the applied method. Who performed these evaluations? What are the qualifications of these 
individuals? What are the implicit assumptions regarding the relationship between directions and 
practice underlying the evaluations? Etc. At an immediate level it seems that the recommendations 
presented in the evaluations are in the interest of nobody: If a practical mastery is trained practically, 
i.e. under the given circumstances, why do the evaluations systematically recommend more practical 
theory reproducing ideas of how practice ought to be, a symbolic mastery? The attempt is thus to 
explain and understand how the recommendations presented in the evaluations are formulated and 
put through, apparently unanimously: What are the interests in what appears to be in the interest of 
no one?  
The focus is neither on the content of the analysed evaluations nor on the content of the 
evaluated formal training programs. Nor is it on the advantages or disadvantages of different 
evaluation methods, or on developing such methods; nor is it on whether the methods are applied 
properly, what possible methodological mistakes have been made, what alternative methods might 
be more expedient etc. In other words: The focus is relatively narrow on the practice of evaluations 
of formal training programs, with perspectives on evaluations in a broader sense and on evaluation 
research as a socially and symbolically indispensable part of the evaluations, i.e. as an accompanying 
discourse to the evaluations. For a discussion of how an accompanying discourse - or a practical 
theory (cf. Durkheim, 1956) - is constructed as an indespensable part of a practice, see Nørholm & 
Brinkkjær (2005). Within the chosen theoretical framework, it is explained why these evaluations 
increasingly naturally suggest improvements that are contrary to a relationship between school, 
education, formal training programs (a symbolic mastery) on the one hand, and the acquisition of a 
practical mastery on the other (cf. Bourdieu, 1977, Bourdieu & Passeron, 1992). 
Theoretical background and frame of reference 
Because of the relatively narrow focus on the social and symbolic function of evaluations of 
education the analyses depended on the existence of a theory about human action including the 
social genesis, meaning and distribution (structure) of these actions. The analyses moreover 
depended on the existence of a theory that, in an anthropological sense, can be applied to explain 
and understand the symbolic function of formal training programs, a scientific theory for the 
reconstruction of a social and symbolic function of formal training programs, i.e. a theory about a 
social distribution of what is misleadingly designated as the ‘results’ of formal training programs. 
Misleadingly, because it is not obvious that formal training programs are instrumental in someone 
acquiring a mastery, at least not in the first instance (see the discussions in Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 
2005). 
The focus of the analyses required a sociological theory to explain a social distribution of different 
forms of practical practice or practical competences and of practical theory respectively; a 
sociological theory that could explain the social relations of dominance in these distributions. This is 
found in Durkheim (1956). The focus even required a theory about the social conditions related to 
sorting in a school or educational system: What is the social function of formal training programs? 
What is the social distribution of different forms of practical competences? What is the social 
distribution of the training and allocation of practical competences respectively? And especially: 
What role do evaluations of formal training programs play in this complex? This is found in (Bourdieu 
& Passeron, 1992). Already at an early stage of the analytical work, it is seen how one is forced to 
step by step construct the object by constructing the implied objects and by implying an 
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epistemological break (see Bachelard, 1968, Bourdieu et al., 1991). This is present in the theories of 
Pierre Bourdieu in particular; the relevance of which also depends on:  
- limiting the scope to describing and explaining, and refrain from suggesting improvements 
- choosing the theories as a result of empirical investigations and not from philosophical or 
other considerations 
- including meta-theoretical considerations of the status of a theory as such 
In other words, the theories Bourdieu are chosen because they offer a sociological theory of 
practice (a sociology of action, praxeology), and a theory of how knowledge about practice is 
obtained (a social theory of knowledge). Finally Bourdieu offers a sociologically reflexive theory 
about the practice of the researcher and about the function of this practice related to the 
investigated phenomenon as well as to the results of an analysis of the investigated phenomenon. 
Even Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, capital and field are applied  
The structures of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence 
characteristic of a class condition), which may be grasped empirically in the form of the 
regularities associated with a socially structured environment, produce habitus, systems of 
durable dispositions20, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, i.e. 
as the principle of the generation and structuration of practices and representations. 
Consequently, these can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their purposes without presupposing any 
conscious aiming of ends and an express mastery of those operations leading to these ends and, 
being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of a conductor’s orchestrating 
action (Bourdieu, 1973, pp. 63-64). 
Note 20 in the quote says:  
The word "disposition" seems particularly appropriate for expressing what is covered by the 
concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions): firstly, it expresses the result of an 
organizing action, having a meaning very close to such words as structure; furthermore, it 
designates a manner of being, an habitual state (in particular, concerning the body) and, 
especially, a predisposition, a tendency, a propensity or an inclination (Bourdieu, 1973, note 20, 
p. 64). 
Habitus and capital are theoretical notions employed in reconstructing the incorporated history of 
a person or institution, and how this person or institution is positioned within a social field. Far from 
being static and determined once and for all, the notions and theories constitute dynamic parts of an 
analytical apparatus: The work of constructing the scientific object is part of a continuous scientific 
process where the concrete theories are applied as the methods for analysis. This is opposed to a 
more common vision where the methods for analysis are determined at the outset as a set of 
procedures and systems of categorization seemingly independent of what they are applied to and 
under what circumstances, as if such considerations were not necessary and everything were given. 
Bourdieu’s notions doxa and illusio are also employed. Doxa is that which “goes without saying 
because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167). The incorporated ideal of what can and 
must be done, unmediated by consciousness; doxa is what is done and perceived as the proper thing 
to do under the given circumstances. Fundamentally and arbitrarily, doxa is perceived of as the only 
thing to do, the normal, that which 'calls itself' and is recognized as the right thing to do, and indeed 
is the only thing to do. That which, pr. social forces, the forces of the social field in question, is the 
only thing to do, think, say etc. 
M. Nørholm – Outlining a theory of the social and symbolic function of evaluations of education 
 6 
Illusio is the accepted corporal, incorporated, practical belief of what is worth investing and worth 
fighting for; the stakes and what is at stake in a certain field. That which, pr. doxa, is worth investing 
in the game (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 333-336). 
Stating that the chosen theory is the method applied might look like a mystification; the 
presupposition and naturalization of a normal vision implies the separation of theory, method and 
(idea-based, pre-constructed) object, and it implies that using the method systematically guarantees 
the quality of the research. However, the discussions in Lundgren (1979) as well as in Lundgren & 
Franke-Wikberg (1980, pp. 142-152) of these implications related to evaluations or evaluation 
research suggest that applying uniform methods regardless of the circumstances only seems to 
ensure fundamentally incomparable results (cf. also Nørholm, 2008a, pp.85-94). In Lundgren (1979 it 
is also stated that evaluations and evaluation research theoretically move “...within an 
epistemological perspective that can be classified as a specific variant of logical-positivism [an 
instrumental positivism, MN], advocating objectivity in terms of methods” (Lundgren, 1979, p. 38, my 
italics, MN). Consequently, a precondition for the mystification and the need to explain it is the 
naturalization of scientific premises diametrically opposite to that of the present analysis. So, instead 
of a mystification, it is a way of speaking clearly: Under any circumstance, any method implies a 
theory; it is futile to maintain independence by claiming to do so. Stating that the chosen theory is 
the applied method is even a way of turning the limiting conditions connected to any theoretical 
starting point into an advantage by systematically trying to control them instead of relying on an, in 
principle, impossible neutral method. 
Stating this explicitly might even suggest a vicious circle analytically: It might seem to imply 
circular arguments; stating that the theory is the starting point not only for the discussions of 
empirical findings, but even for the theoretical construction of these empirical findings, might seem 
to suggest that the research only illustrates the applied method and theories.  
Firstly, a naturalized vision implies what is investigated because the starting point for the 
investigations is based mainly on pre-constructed objects, i.e. on ideas. Secondly, however, stating 
that the theory is the starting point does not imply a refusal to discuss, for instance, the chosen 
categories. It only implies that these discussions must involve systematic, empirically founded 
theoretical reflections on the conditions of possibility for an analytical work as part of the 
construction of the scientific object, using and explicating the chosen theory as a frame of 
understanding (cf. Bourdieu, 2004, esp. p. 85ff.; Bourdieu et al., 1991). Hence, the analyses present 
“...a counter-description of the phenomena instead of taking over the view found in everyday 
language in administrative or political documents or in the heads of the participants” (Callewaert, 
2006, p. 128, my translation, MN). 
In other words, the starting point is following a French epistemological tradition that says “no” to 
that which offers itself as evident for analysis, as part of an active, conscious defence against any kind 
of implicit or explicit normativity, cf. Bachelard (1968), Bourdieu et al. (1991), and cf. for instance 
Durkheim’s maxime that science studies “...facts to know them, and only to know them, in an 
absolutely disinterested fashion.” (1956, pp. 92-93, my italics, MN). 
However, it does not suffice to break with everything ‘out there’ that presents itself as self-
evident as an essential theoretical-methodological step in the construction of the object. It is also 
necessary to break with everything ‘within’, with a scholastic error of the researcher projecting an 
observed regularity or a reconstructed social function to the analysed agents as deliberate 
intentions. Moreover, it is even necessary “... to objectivate everything that is linked to the scholastic 
universe...” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 94): As part of the result of the research project, this approach 
involves the second of a double epistemological break in which the researcher systematically 
compensates for his own place in the field he is part of, i.e. compensates for the social struggles in 
the scientific field in question (cf. Bourdieu et al., 1991). These breaks involve that the researcher 
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takes none of the declarations in and around the evaluations or evaluation research for granted (cf. 
even Bachelard, 1968), and involve an analysis of the work of the researcher (MN) in relation to the 
scientific field in question, i.e. a field of producers of evaluation research (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 
below). 
Setting out from the concrete: The practical implementation 
The research sets out from a spontaneous astonishment over the research connected to the 
evaluation of the formal training of nurses (Evalueringscenteret, 1996, cf. Nørholm, 1997, 2001), an 
astonishment that gradually proved to be inspired by my familiarity with Bourdieu’s way of 
conducting social science. Despite the fact that Bourdieu did not work with evaluations or evaluation 
research (unless the work presented in Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1992), is regarded as 
such), this eventually led to a more explicit awareness of at least two important circumstances: 
- social science is primarily seen as a study of social action, not a study for social action 
- practice is regarded not as generated through the conscious and deliberate actions of 
individual actors (rational choice), but as generated in an interplay between position, 
dispositions (habitus) and positioning/position-taking (prise de position). 
These two central points seem to be contrary to the perspective applied in any formalized 
evaluation. Therefore, it was necessary to also take a closer look at what is generally regarded as and 
calls itself evaluation research3, primarily in Denmark but also internationally, to determine whether 
a sociological approach had been applied in theories other than Bourdieu’s, respectively in 
Lundgren’s theory referring to Durkheim and the sociological tradition. Consequently, the doxa of 
evaluation research is resumed (see below): How are evaluations defined? What implicit theoretical 
assumptions lie behind an evaluation practice? Etc. These questions were applied to the most 
frequently referenced Danish evaluation research. This tradition, identified in the research project, 
involves a normative approach, and consists of research for evaluations. Hence, evaluation research 
does not offer scientific research about evaluations etc. (scientific in a strict sense, cf. Durkheim, 
1956): Practice is seen as rational action rather than generated by a habitus-orientation within a 
field. 
In other words, the doxa of evaluation research offers no explanations of the phenomenon 
evaluation, of its occurrence, or of its social and symbolic function beyond the implicit and explicit 
presuppositions of evaluation research. Consequently, it was important to analyse and discuss the 
social and symbolic function of a normal vision not only of evaluations but also of evaluation 
research. This was done by breaking with the normal vision and it is shown how the presuppositions 
of evaluation research hinder the very explanations sought for: Instead of as a source of explanation 
the doxa of evaluation research texts poses a symbolically necessary part of an evaluation practice. 
Hence, the doxa tends to negate the position of production of scientific knowledge about 
evaluations. Consequently, evaluation research was constructed as a part of the evaluation practice, 
i.e. as an accompanying discourse (cf. Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005). 
                                                          
3 Because of the forces of the social field in question, what is regarded as and calls itself evaluation research 
(doxa) is the only thing there is. These considerations led to abandoning both this rather clumsy notion and the 
notion normal evaluation research. Only the notion evaluation research is used. 
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The analysed evaluations 
The empirical material consists first of all of eight evaluations of formal training programs for the 
professional positions within a medical or health field. The evaluations were required by the Danish 
state as part of a general evaluation of all formal training programs in Denmark, and were carried out 
in 1996-1998. During these 2-3 years, a generally accepted way of performing evaluations was 
established - a paradigmatic way, establishing how evaluations should be performed properly. Even 
though it is never explicitly requested in the terms of reference for the evaluations, it is - e.g. - 
established that an evaluation should also present recommendations for improving what is 
evaluated. Where there are no explicit standards, the evaluations are carried out as if the standards 
existed; when there are no explicit directions, the irregularities are seen regularly, and the 
evaluations are performed as if an explicit standardized method were required.  
Seven of the analysed evaluations were carried out by the Centre for Quality Assurance and 
Evaluation of Higher Education (now The Danish Evaluation Institute) and a uniform method was 
employed. The evaluations were on the formal training programs of dentists (Evalueringscenteret, 
1998), occupational therapists (Evalueringscenteret, 1997a), physiotherapists (Evalueringscenteret, 
1997b), radiographers/radiologists (Evalueringscenteret, 1996a), medical doctors 
(Evalueringscenteret, 1996b), nurses (Evalueringscenteret, 1996c) and midwives 
(Evalueringscenteret, 1994). The eighth evaluation was carried out by the Adult Education Research 
Group at Roskilde University, evaluating the formal training for social and healthcare assistants and 
helpers (Erhvervs- og voksenuddannelsesgruppen, 1996). 
The evaluations present uniform recommendations: The parts of the formal training programs 
allocated to a school or university should consist of more theory and the parts of the formal training 
programs allocated to the working place should consist of a more controlled supervised practical 
training. However, both parts of the formal training are based on ideas of the practical work and not 
on results of scientific research in a strict sense, and the recommendations imply that both parts of 
the formal training programs should consist of practical theory (cf. Durkheim, 1956) or accompanying 
discourses (Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005). 
Hence, despite immediate differences between the evaluations and between the evaluated 
training programs, the same fundamental assumptions are generally found. This is also true of the 
collection of information used in the evaluation. In the evaluations, uniform and standardized 
methods are applied to recording interviews with a number of representatives at many hierarchical 
levels. This exemplifies how a standard or a normal way of performing an evaluation, a doxa of 
evaluations is established, and it is an example of how a certain standard method is both developed 
and applied. This is a typically instrumental positivist vision: Standardized methods are seen as 
guaranteeing comparable results, whereas, in fact, the opposite seems to be the case (cf. Lundgren, 
1979). This is also the case regarding the implication of a theory of action without a symbolic 
economy of human action including speech. A similar methodological vision is found in the analysed 
examples of Danish evaluation research (cf. below). However, the evaluators in the analysed 
evaluations never perform scientific empirical studies of their own, and they never refer to the 
scientific empirical work of others. Stating this is not only stating a fact that seems to be a 
prerequisite for the evaluations to function well and without friction, it also explains why the original 
Bourdieu tradition was maintained in the research projects. In addition, it explains how evaluation 
research only gives rise to additional questions rather than answering the questions: What is, e.g., 
the social and symbolic function of evaluation research? Furthermore, it is convincing in that what 
was initially just a presumption, later became a hypothesis and finally a conviction: Evaluations of 
formal training programs have a social and symbolic function rather than serving to generate 
cognition. However, this is unintentionally obscured by the fact that (as a part of the social and 
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symbolic function) the results of an evaluation are fundamentally socially and symbolically necessary 
for a policy, just as they are socially and symbolically necessary for a professional procedure, albeit in 
the second instance.  
Danish evaluation research 
Another part of the empirical work consisted of preliminarily identifying and mapping of the doxic 
evaluation research, arguing for the construction of evaluation research as a part of the scientific 
object evaluation. Applying primarily Bourdieu’s theory of social fields (cf. Bourdieu, 1984) four 
distinctly different, relatively dominant positions in Danish evaluation research were identified. This 
resulted in the construction of four positions in a field of evaluation research, of producers of Danish 
evaluation research (cf. Figure 1 below). A social division of labour is signalled, including a discussion 
of a social distribution of what seems to be at stake: Defining how an evaluation is carried out 
properly and a rational theory of action. Based on a thorough reading of a great number of texts 
labelled evaluation research (doxa) the selection and reconstruction is considered representative for 
a tradition not only in Denmark but also more generally in an above all Anglo-American tradition. 
This analytical work is outlined below with reference to Nørholm (2008a, 2008b, 2005). 
Under the given, never-challenged circumstances a coherent research approach is identified, a 
paradigm of Danish evaluation research. However, this research is present only under certain 
naturalized social, material, historical circumstances, implying a new public management in which 
the evaluations are employed as managerial tools that impose certain changes necessary only under 
the same circumstances that are also the conditions of evaluation research. However, no empirical or 
systematic theoretical arguments support the assumption that Danish evaluation research helps 
improve practice, whether this practice is an evaluation or an evaluated formal training program. 
Instead, Danish evaluation research seems to offer a socially and symbolically necessary 
administrative knowledge that legitimizes already socially and symbolically necessary administrative 
decisions, as a part of a new public management. 
Doxa in evaluation research implies no distinction between evaluations and evaluation research. 
Both evaluations and evaluation research involve the same kind of normative investigations or 
estimations; inasmuch as it consists of practical theory for evaluations, evaluation research therefore 
functions meta-evaluating evaluating the evaluations. Instead of presenting scientific knowledge 
about evaluations, it rather involves reproducing a social division of labour between evaluation 
researchers and evaluators. And in any case, evaluation research consists of practical theories for 
evaluations and not theoretical theories (cf. Durkheim, 1956). In other words, evaluation research is 
produced as an evaluation of evaluations, offering seemingly value-neutral tools for improving the 
evaluations in order to rectify the deficiencies in relation to, for instance, an alleged value-neutrality 
of the evaluations. Evaluation research is a socially and symbolically necessary part of an evaluation 
practice.  
In itself it is not problematic if one particular approach to the purposive research for evaluations 
(doxic evaluation research) excludes any other approach. However, it is problematic when the doxa 
of evaluation research (a practical theory for evaluations) implies that it is scientific in a strict sense, 
which is signalled by e.g. the fact that the research is conducted by university researchers or at 
universities. Inasmuch as doxa excludes a strictly scientific position it consequently negates the 
position of producing scientific knowledge about evaluations. In turn this negates even the 
counterposition, a position of the production of political position taking towards evaluations and 
towards what is evaluated. 
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In evaluation research, a rational theory of action is presupposed or implied, fundamentally 
viewing human action as enlightened, conscious and rational, i.e. as generated through the conscious 
and deliberate acting of individual actors (rational choice), and not, as in the theories of Bourdieu, 
generated in an interplay between position, dispositions (habitus) and positioning/position-taking 
(prise de position). In evaluation research this excludes viewing and explaining human action in the 
light of a symbolic economy of these actions; human actions mean no more than what meets the 
eye. Consequently, evaluation research offers no explanation of the social and symbolic function of 
evaluations that goes beyond the presumptions of the evaluations or the evaluation research, nor 
does it offer any explanation at all. Nothing reaches beyond the immediate idea that evaluations are 
tools for assessing and improving the evaluated. And, from a more general perspective, no 
reconstructions or scientific explanations are offered for the presence of the evaluations and for why 
they are carried out. 
However, the doxa of evaluation research is not monolithic. It has a great variety (cf. Nørholm, 
2008a, esp. pp. 135-178). Regardless of this variety, doxa implies that (normatively) determining the 
value of the evaluated is a central task. Claiming this is uncontroversial: See for instance Scriven 
(1991, p. 1): “Evaluation is the process of determining the merit, worth and value of things, and 
evaluations are the products of that process”, or, in a Nordic setting, Vedung (1998, p. 20): “To 
evaluate is to scrupulously judge. To judge involves determining the worth” (my translation, MN). As 
another finding, doxa implies a certain rational theory of structure (function) and genesis of human 
practical action; however, this is controversial because it functions as an ideology, as it is based on 
ideas of the structure (function) and genesis of the evaluated, and not on analyses hereof and of the 
symbolic economy of human practical action (including speech) (for examples, see Scriven, 1991, 
Vedung, 1998). In Nørholm (2008a, esp. pp. 135-178, but even pp. 106-135) a large number of texts 
on evaluation/evaluation research are analysed. It is shown that albeit that the texts show a great 
variety, they express a homogenous position (doxa). Even meta-studies of evaluations and the 
underlying assumptions seem to neglect to analyse this symbolic economy of human practical action, 
and consequently seem to reproduce doxa (see also for instance Leeuw & Furubo, 2008). In the 
research project, these assumptions are challenged in an attempt to formulate an alternative to the 
meta-evaluating doxa.  
The above shows how evaluation research functions as an ideology for the evaluations that, in 
turn, function as an ideology for the evaluated, which, in turn, also functions as an ideology. The next 
time round, evaluation research is constructed as a socially necessary practical theory for evaluations 
produced by a number of specialists who possess a double privilege: They explain both how the 
evaluations should be carried out and how the evaluations should be interpreted. In turn, this 
displays a social division of labour that places the ones doing the practical work (evaluations) in a 
dominated position relative to the ones who produce the directions for the practical work and the 
interpretations of this practical work (evaluation research). See below, cf. even Durkheim (1956). 
In general, as long as everything is kept within the implicit or explicit assumptions of the 
evaluations, and as long as these assumptions or premises are not constructed, no explanation can 
be produced by applying evaluation research. Instead of stating this negatively, it could be stated 
positively: The reason why this system functions so well is that everything is kept within a certain 
frame of reference, within a common pre-conscious (doxa); nothing else is necessary under the given 
social conditions. However, this becomes problematic when the presupposed naturalness is 
questioned, as it is done here. In other words: 1. as long as the actions carried out by the participants 
of the evaluations or evaluation research are not objectivated or constructed under the given social 
conditions, and 2. as long as no systematic epistemological break is carried out with these 
assumptions, including breaking with an implicit theory of human practical action without a symbolic 
economy of these actions, 3. even the explanations from evaluation research, produced with the 
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explicit purpose of conveying an understanding of the different mechanisms involved in the 
evaluations, does not offer any explanations. Instead, they too are part of what needs to be 
explained. 
On the existence of a field of producers of evaluation research 
After the analysis of Danish evaluation research and referring to Bourdieu (1984, esp. pp. 126-131, 
1988), who in turn refers to Immanuel Kant and his outline of a Modern university (in Kant, 
1798/1998) and to Kant's discussion of the need for a 'left' position, a lower faculty (philosophy) 
where every truth held by the 'right' position, the upper faculties (theology, law, medicine), is 
challenged. Kant (1798/1998) stresses that the struggle between the faculties (cf. the title Der Streit 
der Fakultäten) is university-internal, and that it is and only can be in the interest of a democratic 
society. After these analysis four distinct positions are identified/constructed and an outline of a 
social division of labour is reconstructed. The properties used in this reconstruction are: (partly sex), 
position, +/- employed at a university (incl. topic), +/- reflecting on many/few evaluations, +/- 
participating in evaluations, seniority in the field in this generation (cf. Figure 1 below), see also 
Nørholm (2005, 2008b, and even 2009): 
- a dominant, ‘left’ position (HFH): A relatively dominant-dominated, dominant feminine 
position, involving major empirical works and involving uniform tasks repeated in infinity (cf. 
Bourdieu, 2001)  
- a middle position (FH): Relative to ‘right-left’ as well as up-down, acting as a sort of Trojan 
horse, advocating for evaluations as the source of new scientific sociological knowledge  
- a middle position, relatively ‘right’, middle relative to up-down (PD-L): Formulating 
methodologies and participating in the Danish Democracy and Power Study (Togeby et al., 
2003) argues for a relative ‘right’position 
- a dominant dominant, ‘right’ position (EA): Involving internationalization, representation, 
conference talks, contributions to international method books and review works. Seniority in 
the field argues for a more dominant position in relation to the other positions. 
In every instance, the empirical work in Danish evaluation research is “impure” (cf. Bourdieu, 
1988, figure A, p. 122). The work never involves a systematic break with the presuppositions 
regarding structure and genesis of human practical action, nor does it involve theoretically founded 
empirical studies characteristic of science in a strict sense (cf. Durkheim, 1956). The contribution of 
the present research project (see Nørholm, 2008a) is to suggest a purer explanation without 
suggesting any improvement of the evaluations. 
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Between the analysed researchers, something is at stake and in play (illusio). The stakes are 
articles, books, participation in conferences as well as in national and international networks etc.; the 
work is purposive, meta-evaluating to improve evaluations and indirectly to improve the order of 
society. Reconstructed, illusio is a sort of solicitude or care for evaluation research concluding firstly 
in improved evaluation research, secondly in improved evaluations, and finally in improvements of 
what is evaluated. In turn, this also implies a sort of solicitude or care for an existing society or an 
existing societal order. 
There are certain common beliefs (doxa) that are seemingly uniform in the field: What 
characterizes a good evaluation: The same objective for a social order, the same underlying theory of 
action. There is a common doxa regarding the content of the notion of ‘research’: It is and should be 
practical theory. There is a common doxa regarding the relation between ‘research’, practical theory, 
and university: Practical theory is and should be produced with the premise that the directions 
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formulated in the purposive research are realized in practice.4 Different strategies for administering 
different, unevenly distributed capitals, and different strategies for obtaining goods are constructed. 
There are internal mechanisms for the distribution of reward or punishments, different mechanisms 
of being consecrated as an evaluation researcher in relation to the stakes mentioned. There is an 
exchange of references functioning as capital for the one referring as well as for the one being 
referred to. There are specific journals, associations, societies and notions with a relatively unique 
content. In other words, there is a mutual understanding, an explicit and implicit matter of course in 
the way something is spoken of and something else is not. But not only is something included and 
something else excluded. The way these certain included subject matters are discussed also shows a 
certain regularity. Hence, a number of characteristics for a social field are identified which in turn 
might argue for the existence of a relatively autonomous field of producers of evaluation research. 
This repeats a self-understanding: Improving or caring for evaluation research, evaluations and for 
the evaluated formal training programs is a matter for the producers of evaluation research. This is 
the way it should be. It is claimed within the field and it goes without saying; it is part of the doxa. 
Hence, part of what is at stake is how this is done best. However, this is miscognized as arbitrary, and 
too, it is miscognized that both doxa and illusio is repeating and meeting demands, presumptions and 
implications found elsewhere, i.e. in a political-administrative field - the field of power. Neither doxa 
nor illusio is the result of an independent, field-internal work. 
In other words, evaluations or evaluation research are reconstructed as tools for a public 
administration, as parts of a new public management, and not as tools for the production of scientific 
cognition. The legitimacy, however, is unchallenged when the production of evaluation research, 
functioning as an ideology ultimately for an arbitrary social order, is allocated to a field cognized and 
recognized as relatively autonomous - the university. 
The second epistemological break 
Performing a second epistemological break (see Bourdieu et al., 1991) involves subjecting the 
researcher (MN) to an objectivation similar to the objectivation of the analysed producers of 
evaluation research. In relation to the properties used in the reconstruction (MN) is positioned in 
                                                          
4 Even the implied assumption that a systematic application of the method shows how the method is 
applied according to the rules is uncertain: Following a rule always implies something else than just the rule: 
The rule never contains a rule for following a rule etc. (see Wittgenstein, 1960, §§81 ff, cf. even Taylor, 1992): A 
rule is needed to follow a rule: No rule is unambiguous without another rule to explain how to follow the rule. 
Hence, to follow a rule demands a rule for following a rule, which in turn demands a rule for following the rule 
for following a rule etc. ad infinitum. Because always and empirically, something happens and not nothing, 
following a rule requires something other than the rule itself; practical action is a praxis (Wittgenstein) or a 
practice (pratique) (Bourdieu) and not the following of rules (cf. even Nørholm, 2011, p. 33). 
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- a dominated, extreme ‘left’ position (MN): A relatively dominated, feminine position, having 
produced only few, strictly scientific empirical works with a very limited empirical material, 
not participating in evaluations, with low seniority in the field etc.  
Figure 2 shows a number of significant points. 1. The work of the researcher (MN), outlining a 
theoretical theory about evaluations, lies outside the field of producers of evaluation research. 
Hence, what is produced in this position does not challenge the social order within the field of 
producers of evaluation research. 2. However, by showing how a theoretical theory about 
evaluations is absent in evaluation research, and by showing that evaluation research is produced in 
a political-administrative field, the field of power, i.e. decidedly non-autonomously, it is shown how 
the work of the researcher (MN) challenges the legitimacy of the producers of evaluation research. 3. 
The present research project was carried out as a Ph.D. project (in education), which might suggest 
the challenge were neglectable. However, challenging the legitimacy even challenges the reputation 
of the researchers in question, a challenge that is increasingly significant the you get closer to the 
temporal, academic, political-economic pole (‘right’) (cf. Kant, 1798/1998, Bourdieu, 1988). This 
might suggest that the findings in this article will not be met in an open, ideal, strictly scientific 
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discussion but rather by means of keeping order, i.e. by the discussion of methodological questions 
etc. Or, rather, the findings will be neglected because they cannot be considered evaluation research 
(doxa). 
In a radical interpretation of the analysis above of the field of producers of Danish evaluation 
research this field is constructed as a part of a political-administrative field, the field of power, i.e. 
decidedly non-autonomous. This implies that the production of an accompanying discourse (cf. 
Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005), of practical theory for evaluations, is also seen in a non-autonomous 
part of the field of power. However, the administrative allocation of this particular type of research 
to universities impedes seeing evaluation research as part of the basis for the legitimizing of certain 
education policy initiatives because these educational policy initiatives are put through as if they 
were scientifically necessary, based on research, or as the saying goes ‘evidence-based’; references 
are made to the production of legitimacy as if it were produced elsewhere (university). An important 
prerequisite for these arguments is that the university is recognized as relatively autonomous and 
outside at least direct political control from a political-administrative power. This discussion shows 
how this is not always the case. 
Gradually, it even seems that all research becomes purposive, practical theory. This undermines a 
relative autonomy of the university by negating both the position of the production of scientific 
knowledge and the position of producing political position taking. Generalizing the above emphasizes 
how scientific reason, a social conquest in line with a national health insurance, existing only under 
certain social conditions including a relative autonomy and hence at risk of disappearing if these 
social conditions change (cf. Bourdieu, 1985, p. 389), is under liquidation. This should not be seen as 
a movement backwards in time to pre-modern societies where everything is in everything, but as a 
movement forwards in time to societies after the Modern, after the dismantling of the characteristics 
of the Modern including for instance a relatively autonomous university. This is the case regarding 
the legitimate grounds for the imposition of administrative decisions connected to another essential 
tool for social sorting and reproduction: School, education, formal training programs.  
In itself, it is not a problem if purposive research is carried out in the context of, for instance, 
university. The problems only arise when nothing else is produced, and when these produced 
practical theories are considered and claimed to be scientific in a strict sense. Under the given socio-
historical conditions, conditions that are never taken into systematic consideration, and as if nothing 
else could be produced. The consequences of this process, a naturalization of one, in principle 
arbitrary position, are suggested here. 
Discussing the findings 
The analyses in the research project resulted in a construction of the social and symbolic function of 
evaluations of formal training programs as a societal tool for social sorting, that is reproducing 
already existing social differences. Furthermore, the analysis resulted in constructing evaluation 
research as a part of the scientific object evaluations of formal training programs as a socially and 
symbolically indispensable practical theory for evaluations produced in a non-autonomous part of 
the field of power. This also seems to be the case internationally: Evaluation and evaluation research 
seems to have the same preconditions and a similar social and symbolic function everywhere. 
The analyses moreover show that an evaluation is not based solely on explicit written guidelines, 
for instance resulting from evaluation research. Under the given circumstances, something else 
seems to be employed; something implicit that ensures that the ‘right’, the ‘natural’ or the 
‘approved’ follows by itself. If the purpose is to understand and explain this implicit ‘something’, it 
does not suffice to set out from evaluation research because evaluation research does not offer that 
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sort of explanations: In the evaluations the method is uniform as a result of both a deliberate 
development of a uniform method and a social necessitation hereof. However, the arbitrarity is 
never challenged; it is naturalized. The results of the research project stress how, instead of following 
explicit written guidelines, evaluations are carried out as position-takings in a political-administrative 
field, the field of power, and not in a scientific field and implying a scientific reconstruction. 
Fundamentally, within the chosen theoretical frame of reference every practice in any field is 
performed practically with habitus as a generative principle. In this case the habituses are opposed or 
even antagonistic: On the one hand, there are political position-takings generated by a political-
administrative habitus, on the other hand, there are scientific reconstructions generated by a 
scientific habitus and characterized by the researcher systematically compensating for his or her 
habitus to control the influence of the habitus. See also the discussion in Nørholm (2011). 
The analyses show how the analysed evaluations imply a theoretical framework similar to that of 
evaluation research. However, the implication is not that the evaluations are carried out as they are 
because evaluation research looks the way it does, or vice versa. Rather, evaluations, evaluation 
research etc. are simultaneously necessary parts of an evaluation practice. In addition, although 
evaluation research, a practical theory for evaluations, is produced at what is cognized and 
recognized as another place, disconnected from the evaluations (e.g. at a university). It is not 
possible to explain and understand evaluation research separately from the evaluations or vice versa. 
Evaluation research is a socially and symbolically necessary part of the evaluation practice, just as 
this other place is constructed in an epistemological break with an immediate vision (cf. Bachelard, 
1968). 
Everything appears to be sensible and natural. However, as soon as the implicit assumptions are 
reconstructed and challenged, e.g. the implied notions of action, knowledge, science, evaluation, 
theory etc. and their implications, everything turns out as arbitrary. The intention in the analyses is 
not to show how the existing paradigm is wrong. However, this well-functioning societal mechanism 
turns out to be problematic, and it gives rise to problems when so many conditions and 
circumstances are presupposed and left unchallenged. In this article it is argued that when the 
arbitrary is naturalized, it has very specific social and symbolic consequences. This leads to another 
main point in explaining and understanding a new meritocratic model for public management. 
Presupposing that a uniform method ensures uniform and comparable results seems rather to 
have the opposite effect: A uniform method applied generally ensures incomparable results, not 
comparable as it is implied. If the tools for examination are not adjusted to what is examined, this in 
itself prevents the investigation from producing the results claimed. And it even supports stating that 
administrative interventions are performed by something else than systematic knowledge or insight 
(i.e. by an administrative habitus). This is supported by Lundgren (1979) and Lundgren & Franke-
Wikberg (1980). This should not be read as the pointing out of an error. It is merely an uncovering of 
yet another regularity that should be taken into consideration when the focus is on the social and 
symbolic function of evaluations of education or on any evaluating practice. 
This social and symbolic function does not depend on the evaluation being carried out in 
accordance with externally or internally formulated criteria, at least not in principle, primarily 
because the evaluations are carried out pr. habitus. But the strength and legitimacy depend on the 
cognition and recognition of the criteria as if they were external. The social and symbolic function of 
the evaluations of formal training programs becomes to perform and legitimize a sorting of the 
evaluated formal training programs. However, this is uncontroversial: The whole idea and rationale 
of an evaluation is to perform some kind of sorting. But, because all that is said in the analysed 
evaluations consists of a dominant accompanying discourse (cf. Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005) 
constituting what can be said under the given, unchallenged conditions (doxa), and because 
everything is carried out as position-takings, produced practically with habitus as the generating 
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principle and not through scientific reconstruction, eventually the sorting reproduces already existing 
social differences, i.e. already existing social relations of dominance. This is, however, illegitimate if 
stated as an explicit purpose. A necessary precondition for the evaluations to be cognized and 
recognized as fair and natural is therefore that the criteria are cognized and recognized as if they 
were external. Another precondition is that the instances performing the evaluations are cognized 
and recognized as if they were external. The research project shows that this is not the case. 
Concluding remarks 
In order to understand and explain the analysed evaluations of formal training programs as 
appearances in societies after the Modern, it proved necessary to construct the relation between 
these evaluations and evaluation research. In turn it proved necessary to construct evaluation 
research as a part of the scientific object evaluation. This theoretical reconstruction points towards 
an outline of the social and symbolic function of evaluations as a part of a new public management in 
societies after the Modern. 
In the analyses a coherent rationale is constructed. Everything seems to be functioning function-
free, without friction: Arguing for the legitimacy of a normal approach does not only seem 
unnecessary under the given, unchallenged conditions; to do so would indeed amount to a 
profanation of the field's most sacred presuppositions, of its doxa (cf. also Lundin, 2008, p. 11). 
Under the given, never challenged circumstances nothing but doxa exists, nothing but doxa can exist. 
In the research project (see Nørholm, 2008a) it is also shown that all the different parts - evaluation, 
evaluation research, encyclopaedia, dictionaries etc. - constitute conditions that, under the given 
social circumstances, are separately necessary for designing the evaluations and the evaluated 
formal training programs as a continuation of and a condition for a certain vision of the relationship 
between theory and practice, or more precisely, between formal schooling and a practical mastery. 
Not only does this vision lie in the continuation of a normal, widespread vision, it is even an essential 
part of the foundation for the legitimacy of school and the educational system. Consequently, the 
social and symbolic function of evaluations of formal training programs is to reproduce and legitimize 
already existing social relations of dominance as if these relations of dominance were universal and 
so that the existing, in-principle arbitrary relations of dominance are cognized and recognized as 
universal, natural relations of dominance. 
The specific way in which the formal training programs are designed may resemble an education 
policy formulated in advance. However, this policy could not be realized without evaluations that 
neither ask general questions nor offer general answers, but instead are asking the questions and 
offering the answers that can be asked or offered - under the given circumstances, which 
systematically are never challenged, analysed or taken into consideration. In turn, this implies a 
collective amnesia with regard to both the social history (genesis) and the function (structure) of the 
employed tools: Instead of appearing as socially arbitrary societal tools having socially arbitrary 
conditions and being designed at an arbitrary time and place, the evaluations and the evaluation 
research appear as absolute tools under absolute circumstances, out of time and place. 
What is seen is a reproduction of one specific vision of the relationship between evaluation and 
evaluation research and between formal schooling and a practical mastery, implicating a so-called 
rational theory of action. More generally, this shows the reproduction of a social division of labour 
(cf. Durkheim, 1956): 
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- in a dominant position: The ones who legitimately talk about practical actions, who 
symbolically deal with how practical actions should be performed and understood, most often 
without performing them themselves; the practical actions are mastered symbolically 
- in a dominated position: The ones who perform the practical actions in question; the practical 
actions are mastered practically. 
The evaluations, evaluation research etc. contribute to the reproduction of this social division of 
labour and, more generally, to the reproduction of in principle arbitrary social relations of 
dominance. As well-functioning societal mechanisms evaluations and evaluation research seem to be 
parts of the way an economic-administrative pole is imposing and cementing one specific, existing, in 
principle arbitrary view and thereby imposing and cementing one specific, existing, in principle 
arbitrary social order at the cost of any other. 
The analyses show how evaluations of formal training programs are but one of the steps in a 
sophisticated four-step societal tool for social sorting: Evaluation research is sorting the evaluations 
of formal training programs, sorting formal training programs, and in turn sorting students, 
apprentices and pupils. Because of the different administrative allocations of the various parts of an 
evaluation practice, the latter amounts to and implies a social division of labour in relation to 
educational level (cf. Durkheim, 1956, Bourdieu & Passeron, 1992) and in relation to an allocation to 
different places in a social hierarchy, a meritocratic stance; not only are the evaluations tools for 
sorting, which is uncontroversial, the evaluations are moreover sorting in accordance with already 
existing social differences and thereby cementing and expanding already existing social differences. 
In other words, this four-step societal sorting tool functions by and through an imposition, 
cementing, reproduction and expanding of an existing and in principle arbitrary social relation of 
dominance at the cost of any other. Because the sorting at any hierarchical level is performed in 
accordance with already existing social differences at any hierarchical level, the interests considered 
are the interests of the dominant groups and not of any group; the evaluations are partial. 
Consequently, an expert or representative taht takes part in performing the evaluations and a 
general imposition of dominant interests in favour of existing arbitrary social relations of dominance 
should be seen as two faces of the same coin. 
Evaluations of formal training programs accompanied by evaluation research as an accompanying 
discourse (cf. Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005) are but one out of many societal tools active in uniforming 
or standardizing quality assessments. The evaluations are administrative tools in a new public 
management in which employees at any hierarchical level participate in the evaluations and hence 
become accomplices of, cognizing, recognizing and claiming the fairness of a social sorting by means 
of these administrative tools. The evaluations are tools for separating the ‘wrong’ from the ‘right’ 
and for uniting the ‘right’ by uniforming the way things can be done legitimately (doxa). The 
presupposition of a new public management model, that nothing exists unless it has been properly 
evaluated, adds to the strength and extent of the evaluations as partial administrative tools. 
It is hardly surprising that a societal order is maintained via sophisticated social mechanisms. On 
the other hand, it is important to investigate why and how the strength of these mechanisms 
depends on nothing being said outright and is instead called and recognized as something else 
(education or training, evaluations, evaluation research etc.). It is also important to investigate why 
and how administrative and managerial initiatives are legitimized by applying tools (education or 
training, evaluations, evaluation research etc.) produced in contexts that are not immediately 
recognized as parts of an administrative or managerial system.  
In the current research project the focus was on the social and symbolic function of evaluations of 
formal training programs and on a socially and symbolically necessary evaluation research, an 
accompanying discourse (cf. Nørholm & Brinkkjær, 2005) to the evaluations. However, in principle 
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there is no difference between evaluations of formal training programs and any other evaluation 
which gives rise to the claim that the social and symbolic function of evaluations as such is equivalent 
to that of evaluations of formal training programs. The same argument holds for the analysed 
evaluation research and any other purposive research. 
In a broader perspective, the findings with regards to evaluations of formal training programs (see 
Nørholm, 2008a) may be applied to any institutionalized evaluation: Because they are performed pr. 
habitus and not pr. explicit rule, any judgement is fundamentally a judgement of taste and seems to 
presuppose social hierarchies (cf. Bourdieu, 1984); some judgements are more proper than others. 
The evaluations are performed by habitus which has the consequence that since they are applied by 
habitus, that is pr. body, the criteria are secret. This being the case because the criteria are explicit 
and not in spite of it. 
All this is enhanced by a meritocratic, neoliberal new public management model. 
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